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THOMAS W. TOLMAN and 
VERLAF.TOLMAN, 
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v. Appellate Case No. 20060713-CA 
LOGAN CITY and JOHN and JANE 
DOES, 1-20, 
Appellees 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. DENIAL OF REZONE WAS "REVERSE SPOT ZONING" 
Point III of the Brief of Appellee, Pp. 22-32, is an attempt to justify the trial 
court grant of the summary judgment upholding the City's denial of the upzoning 
request of the Appellees ("Tolmans") by arguing that the denial was not "reverse 
spot zoning." However, Appellee ("the City") blends the discussion of spot 
zoning and illegal reverse spot zoning. 
Tolmans claim that the rezone denial was unconstitutional "illegal spot 
zoning" or created an "island in a sea of less restrictive uses" as those terms are 
interchangeably used in the cases. This unitary concept that may be labeled 
"reverse spot zoning" must be and is distinguished from spot zoning that may be 
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permissible. This distinction is extensively addressed and argued in the Brief of 
Appellants ("Tolmans Brief). 
The City claims that Tolmans arguments fail to comprehend the essence of 
"reverse spot zoning." City Brf. 23. Those arguments reveal that it is the City that 
fails to comprehend "reverse spot zoning". Tolmans have correctly characterized 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York 438 U.S. 104 (1978) by stating that 
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of "reverse spot zoning" applicable 
here. Tolmans Brf. 10. In holding that New York City landmark restrictions are 
legal, the court distinguishes, defines and adopts the illegal discriminatory 
"reverse spot" zoning doctrine applicable in this case: 
.. .landmark laws are not like discriminatory or 'reverse spot' 
zoning; that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a 
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the 
neighboring ones. 
A/., 438 U.S. at 132. 
The analysis in Tolmans brief of case precedents leading to this U. S. 
Supreme Court Penn Central reverse spot zoning doctrine are correct. 
Without distinction, the City quotes and argues principles of general "spot 
zoning" and then erroneously applies them to this "reverse spot" zoning context, 
City Brf. 24-25, when the principles of legality and illegality of the two types are 
vastly different. It is true in the context of general spot zoning that "Rezoning 
individual tracts or small parcels of land will be held invalid when not enacted in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan". On the other hand, as clearly established 
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by Tolmans arguments, cases and the City's Rathkopf treatise quotes, the essence 
of illegal "reverse spot" zoning is this: If a lot is surrounded by non-conforming 
less restricted uses, the denial of a rezone to conform to the surrounding non 
conforming uses is arbitrary and discriminatory "reverse spot zoning", even if the 
downzoning scheme is valid and in conformity with the general plan. The City 
Brief 29-30 essentially repeats this same specious argument in the context of 
Tolmans cases. All of Tolmans cited cases and quotes on this point expressly or 
implicitly hold that there was illegal reverse spot zoning on the basis that the 
underlying downzoning schemes, including the comprehensive plans, were valid 
and constitutional, unless those cases also held the downzoning schemes were 
unconstitutional. Tolmans also claim unconstitutionality of the downzoning 
scheme even though their claim of illegal reverse spot zoning is not dependent on 
the invalidity of the scheme or plan for this reason. 
The City Brief at pages 26-28 makes the disingenuous argument that the 
Utah cases Tolmans claim recognize and define the illegal "reverse spot zoning" 
doctrine, and distinguish and define legal "spot zoning", are irrelevant. The City 
ignores the critical doctrine defining dictum of those Utah cases, which employ the 
alternative terminology of a more restrictive island in a sea of less restrictive uses. 
Many of the other cases employ both terms. These Utah cases correctly hold that 
their facts do not fit the doctrine, for the reasons detailed in Tolmans Brief. The 
unchallenged facts in this case do fit the doctrine as defined in the Utah cases. 
Because these facts fit the doctrine, this will be the first Utah appellate 
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opportunity to apply the "reverse spot zoning" doctrine to case where that doctrine 
fits. The City attempts to divert the court's attention from the significance of these 
cases by meandering off into an irrelevant discussion of divergent facts. 
On its face, the City's cited case of Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake 
City, 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949), supports Tolmans position and cases that, unlike 
non debatable reverse spot zoning where a lot is surrounded by less restrictive 
uses, spot zoning a lot on the border between zones presents a debatable legislative 
legal spot zone issue. City Brf 28. These boader, large tract, and less restrictive 
use cases the City claims "contain case law both pro and con" (City Brf. 29), in 
fact properly define and limit the application of the doctrine of reverse spot 
zoning. Tolmans Brief 13-14 exhaustively explores these limitations in the context 
of the Utah cases and the ALR article. 
II. THE "REVERSE SPOT ZONING" ISSUE WAS PRESERVED 
The City, at page 22 of its brief, inserts what it claims is a "threshold 
issue," that Tolmans did not "adequately" preserve reverse spot zoning as an issue 
in response to the City's motion for summary judgment. Tolmans begin their 
memorandum argument with: 
The City's denial of Tolmans' rezone of their single family lot to a 
multi family zone, so they can use and sell it for the same multi 
family uses as all his surrounding neighbors, is the most extreme 
case of illegal, arbitrary and capricious denial of substantive due 
process found in extensive reported case law. The controlling 
principles and cases are in...73 A.L.R 5th 223 (titles and sections) 
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"B. Where Parcel in Question Zoned or Rezoned More Restrictively 
Than Surrounding Property... R. 210 
This is the same ALR article cited by this Court as a valid source for line drawing 
between legal and illegal (reverse island-in-a-sea) spot zoning in the unpublished 
decision in Donner Crest Condominium Homeowners' Ass 'n v. Salt Lake City, 
2005 WL 775306. Tolmans Brief 13. Tolmans memo continues by summarizing 
and analyzing the application to this case of the ALR cited and analyzed cases to 
this case: 
Under Sec. 12 (32 Cases ) illegal spot zoning was established in 
every case as this, where a single small lot was more restrictively 
zoned than all the surrounding lots. Illegal spot zoning was also 
established where larger tracts not completely surrounded by less 
restrictive uses were present. Under Sec. 13 (28 cases), there was no 
case where a small lot completely surrounded by less restrictive uses 
where illegal spot zoning was not established. Every such case 
turned on the large size of the tract or adjacent similarly restrictive 
uses. R. 210. 
Tolmans memo continues by excerpting from the Article's analysis of 14 of the 32 
cases where illegal reverse spot zoning was held in analogous circumstances. This 
relevant detailed additional "legal analysis" covered three plus pages of single 
spaced ALR analytical excerpts. 
The memo (R.14) continues with a detailed legal analysis of the application 
and distinctions contained in four Utah cases that recognize the "reverse spot 
zoning" doctrine expressed in terms of more restricted "island in a sea" of less 
restricted uses. Tolmans Brf p. 13. 
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Contrary to the City's assertion, Tolmans have provided both the court 
below and this Court with ample legal analysis. The "reserve spot zoning" issue 
has been well preserved as the central claim of Tolmans from the beginning. 
III. THE REZONE AREA DOES NOT LIMIT TOLMANS CLAIM 
The City argues on pages 24 and 25 that Tolmans have been inconsistent in 
advancing their case for "reverse spot zoning." The City relies on Tolmans 
application including 32 lots rather than the solitary lot owned by Tolmans. The 
City questions whether the denial of a 32-lot rezone application can be the basis 
for a claim that the Tolmans' lot is an island. 
Tolmans unchallenged affidavit attached to the opposition memorandum 
(Tolman Brf. Tab 2) provides the detail showing how he was misled by the City 
Planner Michelle Meachem (Tab 2 p. 2-5) into expanding his intended one lot 
application to include a large 8 acre area (the 32 lots); delaying his application for 
about three months, while he got 17 additional co-petitioners owning 31 lots, and: 
did an extensive survey and analysis detailing the predominant multiple uses in the 
whole downzoned area (Tabs 2-3). The City planners stated purpose was not only 
to improve Tolmans chances for approval of his rezone, but also to provide proof 
to support and follow the Planners' promised upzone plan initiative for this area. 
They failed to initiate the promised plan revision (Tab 2 pg 3 f^ 5). These facts 
were summarized and included in the Statement of the Case and Statement of 
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Facts in Tolmans Brief, and were never challenged by the City. This argument is 
also in Tolmans memorandum. R. 215. 
It would be inequitable to disregard Tolmans one lot original rezone intent 
and objective that the City planners diverted him from, and deny his rezone on the 
grounds that he expanded it to include 32 lots, as the City argues in its Brief (pgs. 
24-25). These uncontested facts include all the requirements for zoning estoppel as 
set forth in Grand County v. Rogers 44 P 3d 734 (Utah 2002) where the Utah 
Supreme Court sets out the conditions, present in this case, for invoking zoning 
estoppel: 
"This court has recognized there are circumstances where it is 
inequitable to enforce a zoning ordinance." Xanthos v. Bd. Of 
Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P. 2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 1984). To 
invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in a zoning case "the 
county must have committed an act or omission upon which the 
developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in 
position or incurring extensive expenses." Utah County v. Young, 
615 P. 2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1980). "The action upon which the 
developer claims reliance must be of a clear, definite and affirmative 
nature." 
Id., at 739. 
Under these circumstances it would be a grave injustice to conclude that 
there would have been a valid single lot rezone but not a multiple. This result 
would unfairly deny the rezone because Tolman was misled by the City into 
including the additional lots. He would be compelled to begin and process a 
single lot rezone application he intended to file in the first place. 
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Tolmans City-prompted expansion of the application area did not change 
the character of the multiple-family uses on the ground. The Appendix at Tab 3, 
pages 2 and 3, shows the rezone application area, the Tolmans' lot, and the multi-
family uses surrounding it. The 31 -lot expansion added 23 lots that are already in 
actual multi-family use. Only seven of the additional lots are still in single-family 
use, and the four islands in which they are found, are each surrounded by multiple 
family uses, most of them within the expanded area. In other words, the character 
of the 32-lot application was no different than the character of the single-lot 
application. See Shapiro v. City of Cambridge, 340 Mass. 652, 166 N.E. 2d 208 
(1960). These facts turn all the City quotes from Rathkopf s The law of Zoning 
and Planning on pages 24 and 25 into powerful support for Tolmans claims that 
there is "reverse spot zoning" whether the focus is on Tolmans solitary lot, or 
expanded to include a few other small islands the larger sea. 
IV. PALERMO, DAFU, AND CHICAGO SUPPORT TOLMANS 
Tolmans Brief at pages 19-20 cited and quoted from Dafu v. Jefferson 
Parish, 200 So.2d 335 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1967), as one among many cases 
supporting illegal reverse spot zoning in this case. Dafu was partially abrogated 
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Palermo Land Co,. Inc. v Planning Comm 'n of 
Calcasieu Parish, 200 So. 2d 482 (La. 1990), but only insofar as Dafu shifted the 
burden of proof to the municipality in reverse spot zoning cases. The City claimed 
that Palermo totally abrogated Dafu. City Brf. 29. The abrogation was only 
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partial, however, and Palermo confirmed all the other conclusions in Dafu. 
Palermo also cited more recent Louisiana cases supporting Dafu's other reverse 
spot zoning principles. In order to conform Dafu quotes to Palermo, Tolmans 
agree that only the paragraph numbered 4 appearing on page 20 of their brief 
should be stricken. 
The City Brief at page.30 erroneously asserts that the challenge in Trust Co. 
of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 96 N.E.2d 499 (111. 1951), was to "upzoning", when 
in fact the challenge was to the unconstitutional "downzoning" amendment of the 
original Chicago zoning plan and ordinance. This landmark Illinois case on 
reverse spot zoning is on "all fours" with this case and powerfully supports 
Tolmans position on all critical points. 
V. THE CITY WAS POWERLESS TO DENY THE REZONE 
The City argues that the trial court correctly concluded that denial of 
Tolmans "DOWNZONING" application was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
City Brief, Point I at pages 10-13. It is critical to understanding the principles 
involved in reverse spot zoning that Tolmans were denied an "upzone " (really a 
recognition of the actual uses), not a "downzone " as the City repeatedly misstates. 
This "DOWNZONING" denial miscue was repeated again in Point III on page 22. 
The City confirms this critical misconception in the lead to its first argument on 
page 11:" The City's denial of Tolmans' request for downzoning was an exercise 
of legislative discretion." This repetition appears to result from a 
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misconception that the City in fact denied a "downzone" when in fact it denied an 
"upzone." This misunderstanding could explain what otherwise appear to be 
fundamental logic lapses and conflicts in many of the City's arguments. In this 
urban context there is nothing downzonable below single family, unless it is to 
pretend that the City can, by zoning, transform and revert the urban landscape to 
agricultural. The "downzoning" occurred when the City, in 1989 moved the 
designation from multifamily to single family. 
The City cites Bradley v. Payson City Corp. 2003 UT 16, 70 P.3d 47, for 
the proposition that "reasonably debatable" legislative decisions must be upheld. 
The City misses the point that in Tolmans case, the decision on Tolman's 
application was not reasonably debatable - the denial of it was arbitrary and 
capricious, because otherwise Tolmans were deprived of the right to use their 
property in the same way as their immediate neighbors. This is the conclusion 
whether the "reverse spot zoning" situation takes the decision out of the legislative 
realm and into the administrative, or removes the issue from legislative debate. 
Either way, the denial must be reversed, and such reversal does no violence to the 
principles expressed in Bradley. The peculiar facts of this case are "extreme" {See 
Bradley at % 24). They are, simply, that Tolmans single family zoned lot is 
surrounded on all sides by multi family non conforming uses. 
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VI. TOLMANS PRESERVED THEIR TAKINGS CLAIMS 
The City's argues at pages 14-20 that Tolmans have not preserved their 
takings claims. The City's principal argument centers on the erroneous 
assumption that the rezone denial taking and 1989 downzone taking was pursuant 
to a valid fairly debatable legislative act. All of the cases the City cites and relies 
on are cases that fix standards for takings and damage thresholds that only apply to 
regulatory takings made pursuant to constitutional fairly debatable legislative acts 
and regulations. The very different rules and standards for takings and damages 
pursuant to the non-debatable, unconstitutional, arbitrary, capricious, illegal and 
discriminatory rezone denial, are threaded through cases, quotes and arguments in 
Tolmans Brief at pages 11 through 22. Those cases and different takings standards 
are all based on findings and holdings of illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory 
reverse spot zoning. They either expressly or inherently hold that takings co-exist 
and occur with acts of reverse spot zoning. They hold that the requisite damages 
are obvious in reverse spot zone takings acts. The excerpts from the ALR analysis 
of 15 cases in Tolmans opposition memorandum (R. 211-216, pg. 13-16), includes 
numerous express and inherent takings-damages findings to this same effect. 
These same basic takings standards apply to the unconstitutional 1989 
downzoning. Tolmans opposition memorandum at R. 215, page 17 states: "The 
lions share of the City's Argument is based on the erroneous assumption that there 
is no evidence that the City's denial of the rezone was arbitrary or capricious, 
when, in undisputed fact and as a matter of law, it is both." This statement had 
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direct application to the City's memorandum argument for a summary judgment 
on the takings issues and merit-less statute of limitations affirmative defense. 
Tolmans have preserved their challenge to the City's vague statute of limitations 
defense in their Brief and by the following argument in their opposition 
memorandum at R. 215-16: "There is no substance nor authority cited to support 
the bare claim that any statute of limitations bars this action. The cause of action is 
based on the denial of his rezone application by the City Council." 
The questions of standards for takings damages and proof should be left to 
further trial court proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Tolmans alleged that the denial of their upzone application was 
unconstitutional reverse spot zoning. Logan City's motion for summary judgment 
did not provide any facts that would defeat Tolmans claims, but rather supplied 
evidence that supported the existence of illegal spot-zoning, and the 
unconstitutionality of the downzoning amendment in the neighborhood in 1989 
that violated the original 1950 plan-ordinance. The trial court erred in ruling that, 
as a matter of law, Tolmans could not possibly prove a case to support their 
complaint. The trial court's dismissal should be reversed, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. In the interest of judicial economy, instructions as to Utah 
law on the topic of reverse spot zoning would be helpful. 
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RESPECFULLY SUBMITTED January/!, 2007. 
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